Border-crossings : some reflections on the role of German historians in recent public debates on Nazi history by Lorenz, C.F.G.
Border-crossings: Some Reflections
on the Role of  German Historians
in Recent Public Debates on Nazi History1
Chris Lorenz
As is well known, the German Federal Republic is famous for its lively in-
tellectual culture in general and for the intensity of its debates on German
history in particular. In a sense, the turmoil of the recent German past is re-
flected in these debates. And if this basic supposition is correct, the cen-
trality of the Third Reich in the debates on German history is to be
expected. However, emphasizing the centrality of the Third Reich is most
definitely not the same as emphasizing the centrality of the Holocaust. In
the following article I will apply three theses to this subject.
According to my first thesis the apparent centrality of the Holocaust in
German history in recent decades is deceptive, because the Holocaust has
been referred to rather than researched. The most remarkable phenomenon in
German historical debate in the recent past is the presence of the Holocaust by its
absence, or, in other words, its repression, symptomatic of its traumatic quality.
Indications of this repression are the phenomena of “splitting off” (Ab-
spaltung) and of projection, which can be observed both in the public de-
bates and in the professional debates of the historians, who are fueling the
public debates. Although the repression has never been complete, as Helmut
Dubiel and Jeffrey Herf have recently argued, it has been the dominant
characteristic of the German historical debate from 1945 onward.2 There-
fore, it can be taken as a first, general characterization.
My second thesis is that, although the repression of the Holocaust in
German history has always been present, at the same time it has gone
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though a substantial process of change, linked primarily to time. The specific
forms of repression of the Holocaust have been primarily influenced by the
succession of generations, whose influence has been more substantial than that
of political ideologies and affiliations (broadly defined, “left” versus
“right”). The general tendency has been a development from an almost total
repression between 1945 and 1965—the period in which the generation of
the perpetrators was still in full power—to a partial form of repression later
on, in the period in which power was being transferred to the children of
the perpetrators’ generation. However, only after the grandchildren of the
generation of the perpetrators made their appearance on the historical
scene—roughly from 1990—did this partial repression give way to some-
thing of a more or less open attitude. Nevertheless, they continued to exist
alongside continuing forms of repression among the older generations. It
makes sense, therefore, to distinguish three approximate periods in this re-
spect, roughly corresponding to the dominance of the three generations:
1945 to 1965; 1965 to 1990; and from 1990 until the present.
My third thesis, then, is that, in the debate on German history, the
Holocaust has, below the surface, been linked to the “German ‘catastrophe’”;
meaning, the loss of independent statehood and the loss of unified nation-
hood for the Germans after 1945, as a consequence of their military defeat.
Both “catastrophes,” so to speak, have basically been regarded by many
German historians—especially those with “rightist” convictions—as compa-
rable phenomena, keeping each other in balance and, in this sense, “compen-
sating” for one another. From this perspective, therefore, both Jews and
Germans had something important in common, i.e., being the main victims of
World War II.
Although this subterranean linkage of the two “catastrophes” has also
been subject to a process of erosion over time, it nevertheless survived the
unification of 1990. This linkage may explain the remarkable fact that the
intensity of the German debate on the Holocaust has increased since the
German unification and not decreased, as was expected by most informed
observers of the German scene. The explanation could be that the German
“catastrophe” was “annulled” by German unification, while the Jewish
“catastrophe” was not.
This linkage may also explain another remarkable and widely ob-
served—though unaccounted for—fact: that conservative historians in
Germany, who waged fierce battles on behalf of “the German nation” in
the Historikerstreit, stayed out of the Goldhagen-debate. The explanation for
this could be that their “case”—the German state and nation—had already
been taken care of by recent history itself. There was no longer any need,
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therefore, for historians to defend German nationalism against its
(post-nationalist) critics on the liberal-left side of the political spectrum, as
had been the case right up to the Historikerstreit.3
I will try to ground my view by presenting a simplified analysis of four
public debates in which German historians have been involved during the
last fifteen years. I refer to the Historikerstreit of 1986–87; the Gold-
hagen-debate of 1996–97; the Wehrmacht- debate, which has been going on
since 1997; and the debate on the role of German historians in National Socialism,
which began in 1998, and is still in progress. In my analysis, I shall focus on
the fundamental connections between the questions and answers formu-
lated in these debates.
I shall begin my analysis with the debate on the role of the German
historians in National Socialism. This debate leads us directly to the heart
of the matter; that is, to German historians who are at the same time both
products and producers of German history. Next, I will try to uncover the
typical arguments and presuppositions used by German historians after
1945, in postwar German historiography. Thereby, I will make a distinction
between the direct postwar period of 1945 to 1965, and the period of 1965
to 1990. The changes in the historiography after 1990, will be dealt with
next, in which I will draw some lines connecting the Historikerstreit, the
Goldhagen-debate and the Wehrmacht-debate, leading to the present scene.
Finally, I will attempt to arrive at certain conclusions.
The Role of German Historians in Nazi Germany
The first public debate can best be introduced with the help of two quotes.
The first quote is from the English historian E. H. Carr: “Study the histo-
rian before you study the facts.”4 Carr’s quote rightly suggests an intimate
relationship between the contents of history and its producers, the historians.
The second quote is from the German sociologist Wolf Lepenies, who re-
cently pointed to the paradoxical character of the ongoing debate on the
role of historians in National Socialism. Lepenies remarked that, in com-
parison to other disciplines, German historians were very late in discover-
ing that they, too, had been involved in National Socialism. “Could it be the
case,” Lepenies asked, “ that the discipline, that professionally deals with
memory and remembrance, is also very apt to forget and repress?”5
Lepenies, following Nietzsche, justifiably called attention to the fact
that all remembering presupposes forgetting, because it is impossible in
principle to remember everything. He who remembers everything is con-
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demned to permanent insomnia, according to Nietzsche. In the case of the
Holocaust, this insight is even more important because, as Saul Friedländer
remarked, the historiography of the Holocaust is still “caught between the
impossibility of remembering and the impossibility of forgetting.”6 There-
fore, in analyzing historiography, we always have to ask exactly who remem-
bers what, and who forgets what, without falling into the trap of a
reductionist sociology of knowledge.7 This is why Carr’s “Study the histo-
rian before you study the facts” is important advice, even after “the death
of the author” has been widely proclaimed and the potential of dis-
course-analysis has been acknowledged.
The issue of “forgetting,” or repression, by historians is, of course, ab-
solutely crucial. Professional historians usually justify the very existence of
their discipline by pointing out that history is the most important institution-
alized safeguard against selective “forgetting” and against collective amnesia.
Therefore, “forgetting” or repression touches on the official raison d’être of
professional academic history. For German historians this problem has ac-
quired an added urgency since the unification of 1990, and since West
German historians have turned into the judges of their former East Ger-
man colleagues. German historians, therefore, have a stake in this debate
about their role in National Socialism and their subsequent “forgetfulness”
in that regard.
Now what exactly is this debate about?
The debate as such became public during the Historikertag in 1998, in
the form of a panel, Historiker im Nationalisozialismus.  The panel itself con-
sisted of several (more or less) younger and marginal historians, such as
Peter Schöttler, Götz Aly, Michael Fahlbusch, and Matthias Beer. They—
and a few others, such as Ingo Haar, Martin Kröger, and Roland
Thimme—had recently done research on German historians during the
Third Reich and had produced unsettling results for the “official” history
and image of the German historical profession.9
According to the “official” history of the profession, German histori-
ans in the Third Reich could be classified in three categories. The first cate-
gory consisted of a tiny minority that had actively cooperated with the
Nazis, such as Walter Frank. The second category consisted of an even
smaller minority who had resisted the Nazis openly and who, for the most
part, had left Nazi Germany. The third category consisted of the over-
whelming majority of German historians, who had neither openly collabo-
rated with the Nazis nor openly resisted them. They had, as the expression
goes, “accommodated” to Nazi rule in a practical sense, while keeping Nazi
ideology at a distance through “innere Emigration,” thus retaining their men-
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tal autonomy. This idea of an “inner autonomy” under Nazi rule was later
elaborated on in a broader context by Martin Broszat, who introduced the
biological notion of Resistenz, suggesting an analogy between Germans un-
der Nazi rule and organisms defending themselves against foreign and out-
side threats. Resistenz indicated the broad gray zone between full
collaboration and full resistance.10
To sum up, the official history of the German historical profession
during the Third Reich was based on their own story: there had been as little
open collaboration with the Nazis as open resistance to Nazi rule; there had
just been a great deal of “accommodation” and Resistenz. And, as was to be
expected, the majority of the historians who rose to prominence in the
Federal Republic directly after the war and who would then dominate the
profession and remain in power until the 1970s, had been classified under
the broad heading of “accommodating” historians. According to the “offi-
cial” history, the historical profession had been purged of the few Nazis in
its ranks and had continued its untainted traditions after 1945.
Although “normal” nationalism of a conservative blend belonged to
these traditions, this had been worlds apart from the “abnormal” Nazi type
of nationalism, which had led to such radical and murderous policies. This
image of “normal” and “accommodating” nationalists, in contrast to “ab-
normal” and “collaborating” Nazis, also applied to the elite of the postwar
historical profession, such as Theodor Schieder, Werner Conze, and Karl
Dietrich Erdmann, who have become the central figures in this new debate.
In Germany, recently, “new historians,” like Aly and Schöttler, did ba-
sically four things that set off this new debate: (1) They questioned the evi-
dence for the supposed Resistenz of some prominent historians in the FRG,
actually putting forward new material documenting an active support of
and involvement in Nazi politics of these historians; (2) On the basis of
their findings, they questioned the borderlines between the “normal” types
of German nationalism and the “abnormal” Nazi type of German nation-
alism; (3) They asked why so much Resistenz among the German historians
apparently led to so little Résistance during the war. Why, for example, had
there been no Marc Bloch in Germany?; and (4) Why had the later pupils of
Schieder, Conze, and Erdmann, who became the “critical” professors from
the 1970s onward, uncritically swallowed and reproduced the wartime sto-
ries of their professors? For the present historical elite of the FRG, this
question is the real nasty one.
The “official” images of Theodor Schieder and Werner Conze were se-
verely attacked by Götz Aly in Frankfurt.11 Schieder and Conze had been
very influential in the historical profession of the Federal Republic both as
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intellectuals and as scientific managers. Moreover, they had been, succes-
sively, the official chairs of the organized German historians between 1967
and 1977. Many of the historians who became professors in the 1970s had
been their students and assistants. So Conze and Schieder had been shaping
the postwar historical landscape of the FRG.
As so many of their contemporaries, after the war, they had not been
very talkative about their activities during the war. Now Aly argued that
both Schieder and Conze had had very good reasons for remaining silent
about their wartime activities, because both had been active members of
the Nazi party. And, what’s more important, Schieder had been involved in
“counseling” the Nazi regime in his field of specialization; that is, the ethnic
and demographic history of Eastern Europe, and especially of Poland.
Between 1939 and 1941, he had advised the Nazi regime to “solve the
problem of overpopulation” in Eastern Europe. In the Polendenkschrift, dis-
covered by Karl-Heinz Roth, it was advised to do so by “rearranging” and
“removing” the ethnic Poles in order to “re-Germanize” the greater part of
Poland (which was also one of Himmler’s obsessions). The Poles should
apparently be “moved” “eastward,” and, in order to make room for them,
they advised the “removal” of the Jews—the Entjudung— from the Polish
villages and cities. Aly argued that historians such as Schieder had in this
way created a “scientific” discourse and program in which demographic
analyses were directly linked to the “Jewish problem” and its “solution.”
This, of course, does not imply that the subsequent Nazi politics of ex-
termination in Poland can be directly interpreted as the “implementation”
of this demographic “program,” but, according to Aly, it does mean that
this way of thinking and speaking had facilitated and legitimized radical and
destructive courses of action against the Jews and Poles. Aly, therefore, has
labeled intellectuals such as Schieder as Vordenker der Vernichtung, a label that
has since been widely contested.
Kocka, for instance, has criticized the application of this label to Schie-
der on the basis that there is a fundamental difference between advising the
“removal” of specific groups and advising that they be systematically
killed.12 Peter Schöttler and Michael Fahlbusch argued that many other
known German historians had played a similar practical and legitimizing
role in the Nazi politics of expansion outside Poland. Both focused on the
interdisciplinary brain trusts and research teams (so-called Volksdeutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaften) that were busy solving “ethnic problems” all over
Europe and legitimizing German territorial expansion by “scientific”
means. After the war, most of these specialists continued their careers in
the FRG. These research teams contained hundreds of specialists in all of
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the human sciences, and, even more significantly, they were heavily funded
by the Nazi regime during the war, documenting their practical value for
Nazi politics.13
Although it was not discussed in the Frankfurt conference, part of this
last debate is the role of Karl Dieter Erdmann. This historian also exercised
considerable influence on the historical profession of the FRG during the
1960s and 1970s, and was the official chair of the German historians be-
tween 1962 and 1967, i.e., just before Schieder and Conze took over the
job. This trio, then, had headed the historical profession in the FRG during
the fifteen years between 1962 and 1977. Contrary to Schieder and Conze,
Erdmann had advertised his wartime story after 1945. He boasted that his
hands had not been tainted by any Nazi dirt (although, of course, he had
done his duty in the Wehrmacht, ending up a major). He had always
pointed to the fact that he had not made a career as a historian in the Third
Reich, contrary to Schieder and Conze, who had acquired their first profes-
sorial chairs at the time, as proof of his ideological and mental distance
from the Nazi regime. Thus, Erdmann made a distinction between himself
and most of his “accommodating” colleagues and positioned himself
somewhere in between the common Resistenz and the almost-absent Résis-
tance.
Until two young historians, Martin Kröger and Roland Thimme, inves-
tigated the evidence recently, Erdmann’s wartime story had been widely ac-
cepted.14 Of course, some of his critical colleagues had had doubts in the
past about the remarkable way he had handled a crucial source—the
Riezler-diaries—during and after the Fischer-controversy, but this doubt had
been “local” rather than global.15 Kröger and Thimme researched the un-
published correspondence and writings that Erdmann had produced in the
Nazi years and discovered some pretty disturbing ideas and material. Be-
tween 1933 and 1945, Erdmann had been writing on topics such as blood,
race, soil, and fatherland in a manner that could hardly be distinguished
from the official Nazi discourse. They found out that, although Erdmann
had not made a career at the time as a historian, this definitely did not mean
that he had not been seriously trying. Even in April 1945, he had found
flattering words for the Führer. So, to all appearances, Erdmann had simply
whitewashed his own past; the abyss between his personal wartime story
and the Nazi regime and Nazi ideology had apparently been constructed
only after the fact.
While the practice of whitewashing personal history was, of course,
quite common in the early years after the war, for the reputation of histori-
ans as professional historians, whitewashing is deadly. It constitutes the “Profes-
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sional Historian’s Mortal Sin.” It is ironic that many German historians
themselves had stated exactly this view directly after the war, identifying
Nazi rule as the rule of lies, propaganda, and deceit, while claiming “truth”
for “real” academic history—meaning themselves.16
This is a border that cannot be crossed without undermining the foun-
dations and credentials of history as a scientific discipline. Accepting white-
washing—even if it concerns one’s own Doktorvater— is probably not
deadly, but it is a serious problem for professional historians nonetheless.
So there is something at stake in this debate on the role of historians in
National Socialism for both the founder generation of FRG history and for
its immediate successors. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that some of
the pupils of Schieder, Conze, and Erdmann—notably, Schieder’s former
student and assistant Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Erdmann’s students Eber-
hard Jäckel and Agnes Blansdorf—have rushed to the defense of their in-
tellectual fathers and have tried to protect them from these assaults. They
pointed out that the incriminated publications of both Schieder and Erd-
mann had been collective “team products,” in which it is difficult to iden-
tify individual responsibilities. Moreover, in Erdmann’s case, the
incriminating book was also “reworked” by the publisher, making the attri-
bution of the individual authors’ responsibility even harder. These defenses,
however, often border on the apologetic, and their success until now has
therefore been doubtful.17
This debate sent something of a shock wave through the German his-
torical profession, especially through the “old guard” of critical social his-
tory, like Wehler, Hans and Wolfgang Mommsen, and Kocka, who were
used to being the critics and not the object of criticism. There is, therefore,
also a definite element of Schadenfreude and of settling old scores with for-
mer opponents in this new debate.18
The new insight, however, is definitely not that all German social histo-
rians now actually appear to have Nazi dirt on their hands (as is nowadays
sometimes suggested), but only that the borderlines between “critical” so-
cial history and “conservative” history will have to be rethought, just like
the borderlines between “normal” and Nazi history. Therefore, not only are
the “missing wartime years” in the biographies of former leading historians of
the FRG at stake, but also the “missing link” in postwar FRG historiography
between the kampfende Geschichtswissenschaft (the Volksgeschichte) of the Nazi
era and of postwar, “objective” history.19 The lines that used to be drawn in
this historiographical area do not stand up to critical scrutiny, as has be-
come so clear in the meantime. This conclusion is also backed up by other
recent analyses, which cover the total historical profession and even the
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neighboring Geisteswissenschaften. These include Ursula Wollf’s book on
German historians in the Third Reich and Frank Hausmann’s study on the
Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaften.20
During the heated debates of the Frankfurt conference, it became quite
clear that the “official” history of FRG historiography would have to be
rewritten. Now that the Nazi past of three of the FGR figureheads—Schie-
der, Conze, and Erdmann—has been documented, it will no longer be pos-
sible to state that the influence of Nazi ideology on German historians was
restricted to a small lunatic fringe while the majority remained resistant.
Hans Mommsen hit the nail on the head when he criticized those col-
leagues who tried to control the damage for the profession with the usual
arguments that most of the facts had been “known for a long time” (given
the known “confessions” of historians like Heimpel and Aubin). Therefore,
the official storyline of the German historical profession would remain “ba-
sically the same,” although, of course, “some accents” would change, as one
would expect in “normal science.” Perhaps the distance between some in-
dividual historians and the Nazi regime was smaller than presumed until
now, but, of course, it was impossible to generalize from a “handful of in-
dividual cases.” Judgment would have to be deferred until “more and thor-
ough research” had been done, because “journalists” such as Aly relied on
an assoziative Kollagetechnik (Christoph Dipper). Against this professional de-
fense mechanism, and referring to Theodor Schieder and Werner Conze,
Hans Mommsen countered: “This is not proximity to National Socialism,
this is National Socialism.”21
This direct and personal Nazi involvement of FRG historians who led
the profession up until the 1970s, and which has now been uncovered, helps
to explain why the Holocaust was “forgotten” and hardly made it to their re-
search agenda. Holocaust research in Germany was left, by and large, to its
survivors, as Dieter Pohl recently observed.22 And it is equally significant to
note, as Alf Lüdtke recently did, that survivors’ testimonies in the late 1940s
and 1950s were largely set aside by the German historical profession as
“emotional” and “not distanced” and, therefore, as “not objective.”23
This disqualification of the perspectives of the Holocaust victims as
“not scientific” and “subjective” is surely a symptom of the phase of almost
total repression. However, it proved to be long-lived, as the discussion
between Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer in 1988 illustrates. Broszat’s
argument, as Friedländer pointed out, suggested a direct relationship be-
tween Jewish perspectives on the Holocaust and “mythic remembrance,” at
the same time implying that German perspectives lead to more “scientific”
results.24 Remarkably, in this context, when Germans appeared as victims
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in front of German historians—as was the case in the multi-volume Doku-
mentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa project—their sub-
jectivity was not regarded as a serious impediment for “objectivity.” In time,
however, German historians began to perceive the Jewish “other,” although
at first only under the guise of their “fellow countrymen.”
The German and the Jewish “Catastrophes,”
Part 1 (1945–1965)
Most FRG German historians of the founding generation, such as Gerhard
Ritter and Friedrich Meinecke, spent their energy during the first twenty
years after 1945, on “rescuing” modern German history from the “Nazi
‘catastrophe,’” just as most German historians had been trying to “rescue”
German history from the Versailles Treaty after World War I. Arguing for
both the legitimacy and the normalcy of the German state and nation since 1871
was their fundamental historiographical concern, even when they appeared
to be arguing in favor of supra-national perspectives and frameworks, such
as “Europe,” the “Christian Abendland,” or, later, the “free, democratic
West.”25 The “Nazi ‘catastrophe,’” as they understood it, basically meant
the German military defeat and its consequences; i.e., the loss of the independent state-
hood of Germany, the partition of Germany, and the loss of East European territo-
ries—and, thus, not the Holocaust. Therefore, dealing with this “catastrophe”
in German historiography boiled down to a “search for the Lost Nation”—
die Suche nach der verlorenen Nation, as Sebastian Conrad aptly put it recently.
Symptomatic of this concern were the discussions that postwar Ger-
man historians soon staged on the “father” of the German nation-state,
Otto von Bismarck. In various ways, historians like Gerhard Ritter, Hans
Rothfells, and Ludwig Dehio tried to fit recent German history into a pat-
tern of general European or world history. In this way, they were normal-
izing Germany and saving Bismarck and his creation from the widespread
(Allied) critique of militarism that evolved into two world wars within three
decades. The liberal use of explanatory categories, like Katastrophe
(Meinecke), Schicksal and Dämonie der Macht (Ritter), or the use of volcanic
metaphors for politics (Dehio) systematically involved the bracketing of all
questions of German responsibility. The recourse to anonymous Strukturen
(Schieder/Conze), supposedly characteristic of “modern mass society” in
general, had the same effect 26 (as had the recourse to anonymous “capital-
ism” and abstract “modernity” later). In the dominant German histo-
riographical discourse, centered on the nation-state, the Jews therefore
Chris Lorenz 69
remained practically voiceless for almost two decades after 1945.27
Friedrich Meinecke's book, Die deutsche Katastrophe, published in 1946,
represents a clear example of the German “catastrophic”-view. Meinecke
basically presented a book-length apology for the German Geist and nation,
which had suffered so much from Hitler and the Nazi regime. He feared
the identification of Germany with Nazism by the victorious Allies and its
consequences. Therefore, he emphasized the almost complete
“un-German” character of Nazism, illustrated vividly by the cruel fate Hit-
ler had bestowed on Germany and the Germans, who now faced a “com-
plete annihilation” in the East.28 Eye to eye with this imminent catastrophe,
he tried to remind the western Allies of Germany’s indispensable contribu-
tion to European culture, not to mention the German contribution to the
basic value of the Abendland, diversity in unity. At times Meinecke even
suggests that the Allies had defeated the common enemy of “European cul-
ture” and only finished a job that the Germans were busy handling them-
selves.29 This appeal to the common “European heritage” would still be
used by Hillgruber forty years later.
Meinecke devoted a lot of his energy to sketching the recent and immi-
nent catastrophes that were threatening the Germans. The Nazis, who had
succeeded in “deluding” “the masses” of Germany for a short time, had
plunged them in a stupidly planned war, which led to the “Katastrophe von
Stalingrad” and to the “Mythos vom Endsiege noch einige Wochen vor der End-
katastrophe.” Meinecke gave the military, which made the attempt on Hitler
in 1944, the heroic credit of trying to save Germany from “der größten Katas-
trophe seiner Geschichte.” “Viele Städte aber wären unzerstört, viele Tausende von
Menschenleben bewahrt geblieben”; if only the attempt on Hitler's life had suc-
ceeded.30 The “Jewish catastrophe,” which was practically complete by
1944, remained totally absent from Meinecke’s book. Although Meinecke
outrightly rejected racial and antisemitic thinking, his sketch of the fate of
“the Jews” in Germany, treated as a collective with collective inclinations,
remains rather ambivalent.31
Much the same goes for German political discourse, although Herf has
rightly pointed to the existence of a minority tradition in this respect that
was explicit about the Jews and their fate.32 Symptomatic in this context,
however, is the fact that, when the fate of the German Jews was brought up
in parliament, they were generally referred to as (former) members of the
German nation and not as Jews.33
The German state and nation remained by and large the fundamental
frame of reference for both German historiography and German politics
after 1945, just as had been the case before 1945. This does not mean that
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research on the Holocaust was completely absent in Germany during the first
twenty years after the war, but, rather, that it was rare.34 Thus, in histo-
riographical practice, the usual reference to the Holocaust in postwar Ger-
many as “unspeakable crimes,” “committed in the name of Germany”
basically meant silence about the German perpetrators and their Jewish vic-
tims and much writing about the problematic normality of “Germany.”35
Historiographical and political discourse, between 1945 and 1965, were
thus both characterized by a fundamental repression with regard to the Holo-
caust, which manifested itself basically in three mechanisms.36 The first
mechanism in this case is “splitting off,” or Abspaltung, by which the guilt
and responsibility for the “unspeakable crimes” was completely transferred
to Hitler, the Nazi elite, and the SS. The political leadership was “split off”
from “the German nation.” Crucial to this interpretative operation was that
the Wehrmacht, too, consisting of some twenty million Germans, was split
off from the Nazi regime. Both the German nation and the Wehrmacht
were represented as being led treacherously into the bloody “abyss” (Ab-
grund) by an Austrian “demon,” or a “new Genghis Khan” (Ritter) and his
criminal bunch.37 Splitting off thus resulted in the claim of victim status by
Germans and was dependent on these interpretative steps.38 And since
Hitler and a few of his direct associates were dead or had been put on trial
after 1945, justice was done and that was the end of it. And since the guilty
Germans were dead or had been sentenced, the rest of the Germans were
not guilty by implication. “The masses,” although frequently referred to by
historians such as Ritter and Meinecke as the source of most modern evils,
such as totalitarian dictatorship, were not yet transformed into an object of
historical research.39 It would not be until the 1980s—with the advent of the
history of mentalities and of the Alltagsgeschichte—before the historical gaze
was lowered and the life and world of “the masses” really came into the
historiographical focus (and not only in Germany).
The second mechanism is projection. This mechanism is at work in the
frequent denials of the Kollektivschuldthese. The remarkable fact about these
denials is that the Germans in this case were defending themselves against
an accusation that nobody had formulated. The accusation, therefore, was
an obsessive product of the defenders’ imagination.40 The same mechanism
is at work when the responsibility for the Holocaust is projected on oth-
ers—such as the communists, the Jews themselves, or the Soviet Union.
Traditionally, this type of argument has been wrapped in the form of some
Präventivkriegthese.
The third mechanism is relativization by Aufrechnung. This mechanism
boils down to balancing the suffering of Germans because of others with
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the suffering inflicted by Germans on others. The question of temporal or-
der is, of course, not asked and, therefore, the extensive research project
concerning the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe in 1944–45 did
not need any moral legitimization vis-à-vis the Holocaust.41
All three mechanisms of repression can be observed in German histo-
riography and in public debates on the Nazi past right up to the very pres-
ent, although, over time, in an ever-lessening degree. The remarkable
fixation on the German nation and state also persists to the present. This
even holds true for the famous Gesellschaftsgeschichte from Bielefeld and Ber-
lin, as Paul Nolte recently has noted, since the Gesellschaft implied in the Ge-
sellschaftsgeschichte was no other than the traditional nation-state.42
Up to the 1970s, the “German ‘catastrophe’” was conceived by most
German historians as far more important than the “Jewish ‘catastrophe.’”
Self-pity, not pity for another, was the dominant historiographical senti-
ment.43 The “German nation” and its Wehrmacht could, at times, be pre-
sented as “the first victims” of the Nazis, who had “lived through” a
terrible experience because of the Holocaust. In less extreme cases, the hier-
archy of victims was hidden with more subtlety by broadening the category
of victims in such a way as to include those who had died while doing
service in the Wehrmacht and the SS.44 Andreas Hillgruber’s book Zweierlei
Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Ju-
dentums, published in 1987, codifies this view in a pure form. Hillgruber,
known for serious scholarship before the Historikerstreit, in Zweierlei Unter-
gang simply juxtaposed the wartime “catastrophic” fates of the German
population (including the Wehrmacht) and those of the Jews in separate
chapters. The author made no direct connections between the two (thereby
unleashing the infamous Historikerstreit), while elevating the loss of the
German East European territories as die wohl gravierendste Kriegsfolge.45 Only
in the 1990s would the issue of the “victimhood” of the Germans and their
military be seriously debated by German historians.46
The Jewish and German “Catastrophes,”
Part 2 (1965–1990)
From the 1960s onward, and accelerating in the reform era of Willy Brandt,
fundamental and complex developments began to change the German his-
toriographical landscape. These would fundamentally alter the places of the
German and Jewish “catastrophes.” In this framework, a few remarks must
suffice.
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First and foremost, beginning in the 1960s, there was a generation shift.47
Now that the generation born around 1930, with no active involvement in
the Nazi regime, was making its way to the professorial chairs, it became
possible to face the Nazi Reich for the first time and put an end to its al-
most complete public repression. Slowly but surely, more and more Ger-
mans came to accept an abstract and general German responsibility for the
Nazi crimes and their consequences. Generally, however, they evaded the
question of the concrete perpetrators—except for the ones put on trial,
whose complicity in mass murder could be framed in juridical terms (such as
the camp guards, etc.). In these trials, the attention that was formerly given
to the German victims of the KZ system shifted to the German perpetrators,
but the perspectives of the non-German victims were still largely left out of
the picture.48 German historiography basically shared this juridical shift in
perspective, because it was directly linked to the juridical process (in the
form of expert reports, etc.). Consequently, the victim-perspective was ab-
sent from German historiography at the time.49
Very typically for FRG historiography, the Holocaust was thus basically
treated as some kind of background to the Third Reich, as an implicit point of
reference and not as a fundamental and central feature of this system. In his
exchange with Saul Friedländer, Martin Broszat would later justify the fun-
damental “eccentricity” of the Holocaust in German history and historiography with an
“objective” appeal to “historical method”: because most Germans were not
aware of the Holocaust during the war, professional historians could not
transform the Holocaust into the central event in, and the central charac-
teristic of, Nazi Germany after the fact.50 The Holocaust was thus still re-
ferred to—outside the tiny group of specialists—as an abstract,
“unspeakable phenomenon,” which was identified but not researched and
analyzed. This remarkable phenomenon, which I would like to label as a
presence by absence, may be illustrated in two central domains of modern
German historiography: in the Sonderweg-discussion; and in the debate on
the structure of the Nazi state between so-called intentionalists and structural-
ists.51
Crucial for all later developments in German historiography was, of
course, the Fischer-controversy of 1961–62, named after its initiator, Fritz
Fischer, who started the debate with his book Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die
Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18. In retrospect, one of the
most interesting characteristics of this debate is that while, ostensibly, the
subject of the debate was the war aims of Imperial Germany in 1914, the ac-
tual but hidden subject was Fischer’s implied thesis that the war aims of Im-
perial Germany had been similar to the war aims of Nazi Germany. So,
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actually, the wartime policies of Nazi Germany were put on the agenda by
Fischer by discussing the policies of Imperial Germany. Retrospectively, there-
fore, the debate can be decoded as a kind of historiographical shadow-boxing,
in which Imperial Germany and World War I have functioned as “histo-
riographical stand-ins” for Nazi Germany and World War II.
This remarkable transfer from Nazi Germany to Imperial Germany may ex-
plain, firstly, why German academic historians have primarily been re-
searching and discussing Bismarck instead of Hitler in light of Auschwitz
from the 1960s until the 1990s. And, secondly, it explains why German
historians spent most of their energy on charting the presumably long
“road to Auschwitz” before 1918, instead of on Auschwitz itself. This trans-
fer of historiographical energy from National Socialism to “proto-fascism”
has proven a lasting feature of the debate on the so-called Sonderweg of
modern German history (that is, the idea that modern German history took
a peculiarly fateful turn up to 1945). In this context it is significant that the
most famous proponents of the (critical) Sonderweg-view, Hans-Ulrich
Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, up to now, have only written studies on the
pre-history of Nazi Germany and not on Nazi history itself.52
This virtual absence of the Third Reich and the Holocaust in the actual re-
search of the critical Sonderweg-school is all the more remarkable because of
their critique of Marxist approaches. Their critique on Marxist approaches
boiled down to the argument that the typical Marxist reduction of National
Socialism to capitalism repressed the specific racial and genocidal charac-
teristics of the Nazi regime. So, Marxists of all persuasions, and in particu-
lar those Marxists who were critical of the Sonderweg-view, such as Geoff
Eley, were castigated for their blindness to Auschwitz, which was suppos-
edly central to the Sonderweg interpretation.53
The second domain of modern German historiography, where one can
observe a similar transfer of Auschwitz, is the debate on the structure of the
Nazi state between so-called intentionalists and structuralists. Intentionalist
historians, such as Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus Hildebrand, tried to ex-
plain the working of the Nazi state primarily on the basis of the intentions
of the leading Nazis in general and of Hitler in particular. The basic ex-
planatory scheme of intentionalism is simple: because the intentions of the
Nazi elite were murderous, Nazi practice was murderous—with the Holo-
caust as a result. On the contrary, structuralist historians, such as Martin
Broszat and Hans Mommsen, have tried to explain the functioning of the
Nazi state primarily on the basis of the specific structure of the Nazi state,
thereby bringing the complicity of the German Funktionseliten into the
Holocaust-picture, albeit by implication. According to structuralist histori-
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ans, the mass murders by the Nazis were not so much planned a long time
before, but were rather the result of unintended processes of “cumulative
radicalization” during the war. This “cumulative radicalization” was an un-
intended consequence of the double structure of the Nazi state, in which a
structure of organizations and persons originating from the Nazi party was
attached to the existing state structure. Being unintended, this process,
paradoxically, implied a “guiltless guilt” of the Germans involved.
Now, what is remarkable for both intentionalist and structuralist inter-
pretations is that, paradoxically, the actual Holocaust—the practice of mass
murder—is more or less left out of the picture. Both explanatory schemes, in
fact, focus on the ideological or institutional conditions and mechanisms that
made the Holocaust possible instead of focusing on the actual Holocaust. As
Ulrich Herbert observes: “Attention to the mass murder itself, to the direct
perpetrators and their victims was viewed as unworthy of scholarly treat-
ment and even as ‘voyeuristic’ (as Hans Mommsen has characterized it).”54
In both intentionalist and structuralist interpretations, the actual execu-
tioners of the Holocaust outside the SS and the SD—“the men who pulled
the trigger”—were absent. This “omission” went more or less unnoticed
until Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen came along from the
United States, in 1992 and 1996, with their books Ordinary Men and Hitler’s
Willing Executioners, respectively.
Therefore, we are faced with the apparent paradox that the Holocaust
seems to be largely missing from many studies of the German historians
dealing with the Third Reich, because they have transferred their energy
from the investigation of the Holocaust itself to its ideological and institu-
tional conditions. Of course, these studies on the structure of the
“Nazi-state,” including Karl-Dieter Bracher’s The German Dictatorship and
Helmut Krausnick’s Anatomy of the SS- State, immensely improved the his-
torical understanding of Nazi Germany. However, the leading question was
not “who exactly has done what and when to the Jews in Europe between
1933 and 1945?” or “who has suffered what fate, where and when at the
hands of the Germans and their allies?” but “how was IT possible?” The
IT itself was largely taken for granted. Thus, again, we observe the presence
of the Holocaust by its absence in German historiography, even among his-
torians dealing with the question whether there has been a Führerbefehl for
the Holocaust or not.
The generation shift from that of the perpetrators—the Schieder,
Conze, Erdmann generation, born between 1900 and 1910—to the genera-
tion of their sons and daughters—the Mommsens, Broszat, Wehler, etc.,
born between 1930 and 1940—has apparently not been sufficient to effect
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a fundamental change in this respect. Although the historians of the later
generation did put the Third Reich on the historical agenda, and some his-
torians did extensive research on it, they have, by and large, avoided re-
search on the actual execution of the Holocaust outside the SS and SD.
Paradoxical as it may seem, all the discussions in the 1970s on “fascism”
brought empirical research of “fascism” almost to a halt. This actually lends
some credibility to Herbert’s idea of a second repression of the Nazi past
under the guise of a permanent discussion.55
Only this “omission” explains why the success of Goldhagen’s Hitler’s
Willing Executioners could be experienced by the German historical profes-
sion both as a shock and as a failure; and only this “omission” explains the
remarkable fact that public intellectuals like Habermas and Reemtsma have
welcomed the effect of Goldhagen’s infamous book on the debate in Ger-
many while remaining silent about its academic qualities. Perhaps the ex-
planation for this “omission” must be sought in the circumstance that most
FRG German historians of this first postwar generation were still not psy-
chologically capable of facing the horrendous deeds of their elder genera-
tion. The understandable avoidance of the direct confrontation with
massive horror inflicted by direct relatives—das Nichtdurchhaltenkönnen and
das Nichtertragenkönnen, which has been mentioned in interviews by many
belonging to this generation—may explain the avoidance of the Holocaust
and the tendency toward its abstraction in the historiography.
Dubiel suggests an explanation along these lines. In his opinion, the
collective guilt of Germany was simply too great for Germans to accept af-
ter the war.56 And since Germans were not able to accept the guilt and re-
sponsibility for the Holocaust, they were unable to interpret Nazi history as
their own. Instead of “taking over” Nazi history as their–German–history,
they sought refuge in Ersatzidentitäten, in identifications with either their
victims or their victors. This is what anti-totalitarianism in the FRG and
anti-fascism in the GDR amounted to over a period of four decades. As Du-
biel points out, the interpretation of National Socialism as a form of totali-
tarianism enabled Germans both to distance the FRG from the Nazi period
and to compensate for their Nazi past by waging war on “the other form of
totalitarian dictatorship,” i.e., “communism,” side by side with the victori-
ous United States. Part and parcel of this interpretation was also the legend
that the Weimar democracy had been overturned by an alliance between
“brown” and “red fascists,” in this way obfuscating and exonerating the
historical role of the German elites as the ones who helped Hitler to politi-
cal power.57 A similar story was developed for anti-fascism in the GDR,
which enabled the Germans in the east to take distance from their past and
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to identify with the other victor, the Soviet Union.
Dubiel, however, does not explore more cynical interpretations of the
same set of facts, such as the possibility that many Germans rejected guilt
for the Holocaust simply because they felt no guilt, or because they still re-
garded their actions as somehow “legitimate.” In that case, those Germans
might have adopted new individual and collective identities simply because
of juridical and strategical reasons. Dubiel does not consider this “cynical” (or
“Austrian”) interpretation, because he has limited his research to the par-
liamentary, i.e., the public debates. And “post-conventional” and “post-national”
arguments are, of course, more likely to be used in the Bundestag than at
the Stammtisch. From this perspective, Germans with the mindset of Hans
Schneider/Hans Schwerte, who for a very long time did not show pity or
regret, enter into the picture of postwar Germany.58
A last explanatory factor for the “omission” of the Holocaust in FRG
historiography may be the circumstance that most historians of this gen-
eration saw the legitimization of the FRG as their lifelong project, as Paul
Nolte suggested recently.59 Therefore, the foundational myths of the early
FRG, especially the myth of the saubere Wehrmacht, were put on ice by most
of them until the next generation of historians came along, i.e., from the
1980s onward.60
The Public Debates and the German Historians
(1986 –Present)
When we turn from academic historiography proper to the great public de-
bates on the Third Reich from the 1980s onward, we can observe that, at
first sight, the public taboo on discussing the Holocaust is disappearing.
The number of public debates related to the Holocaust has been growing as
time progresses, and, in that sense, the 1980s have really made a difference
with regard to the period before. It was then that the second postwar gen-
eration made its appearance in the public sphere and in the historiography.
A veritable public Holocaust-discourse has emerged in Germany from
the 1980s, in which German identity was sometimes even reformulated into
that of “the Holocaust-nation,” deserving a “split” existence in two states as
some kind of punishment for the Holocaust. Because many Jews, inside
and outside Israel, had also increasingly redefined their identity in relation-
ship to the Holocaust, Dan Diner has coined the “negative symbiosis” between
Germans and Jews in this context.61 In the same period the “German ‘ca-
tastrophe’” receded into the background as a result of the economic suc-
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cess of the FRG and of the successful Ostpolitik, leading to the de facto
recognition of the GDR. A constantly dwindling number of Germans con-
tinued to long for Silesia.
And then, suddenly, came the political earthquake of 1989, which
changed the coordinates of the postwar era in a hitherto unimaginable way.
After the unexpected unification of the two German states in 1990, one of
two “catastrophes”—the “German” one—disappeared just as unexpectedly
into thin air: the Schlussstrich under the Nazi past, which had so often been
demanded, now showed up as a gift from History itself. The unification
thus effected a fundamental change in the coordinates of public German debate. Now
that the two German states and nations had been united, both state and
nation ceased to be the fundamental problems that had preoccupied most
German historians since 1945—except for a few radical right-wingers, who
kept longing for a self-conscious German Machtstaat.62 Consequently, the
“burden of Nazi history” after 1990 consists of only one “catastrophe,” i.e.,
the Jewish one.
This very new circumstance may explain why, after 1990, the German
confrontation with the Nazi legacy has been steadily increasing in intensity
instead of decreasing. It was rather unexpected to see the new unified Ger-
man Republic stumbling from one debate on the Holocaust to another.
The debates named after Goldhagen, Walser and Bubis, and Peter Sloter-
dijk, have, combined with the Mahnmal-debate and the Wehrmacht-debate,
almost overlapped one another, not to mention the discussions on Nazi
gold, life-insurance policies, and the compensation of forced and slave la-
bor. So the paradoxical effect of what appears to be “the Final Solution of
the German problem” since 1990, is that the Nazi German “Final Solution
of the Jewish problem” has come closer to the German present than ever
before 1945. One is tempted to interpret this remarkable phenomenon as
“the return of the repressed.”63
The three great debates since 1990 seem to support this view of a de-
creasing distance from the Nazi past and, at the same time, a growing open-
ness on the side of German historians to confronting the Holocaust. The
Historikerstreit of 1986–87 can be seen as the last massive attempt of the
conservative fraction within the German historical profession under the
“Old Regime” to put the Holocaust vigorously at a distance. As is known,
they tried to do so by moving the Holocaust to the terrain of “comparative
genocide studies” and by projecting the responsibility for the Holocaust on
the Soviet Union, testifying to the old mechanisms of denial and projec-
tion.64 And, as is known, this attempt also failed.
The Goldhagen-debate, a decade later, can be seen as a somewhat be-
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lated reaction to the crucial question that had not been asked in the Historik-
erstreit: the question of “who did IT?–the Holocaust—except for the SD
and the SS?”65 Although, in the Historikerstreit, all the energy had been in-
vested in debating the “singularity” of the Holocaust, the actual perpetra-
tors of the Holocaust were kept out of the discussion. Therefore, in the
context of German public debate, Goldhagen did ask a crucial question, namely,
“who actually did IT– except for the SD and the SS?” Now, of course,
Goldhagen’s answer to that question: “The ordinary Germans did IT, be-
cause Germans are born anti-Semites” was very simplified and, thus, very
wrong. Nevertheless, the ensuing debate around this very wrong answer
made perfectly clear that German historians had not invested much time in
looking for the right answers, simply because only very few had asked that
question. The police units on which Goldhagen had done his research were
hardly researched before, and the same goes for Goldhagen’s “death-marches.”
And the involvement of the presumably “normal,” “professional”
Wehrmacht in the Holocaust has, as Omer Bartov recently observed, long
retained its status of an absolute taboo.66
The recent Wehrmacht-debate more or less confirms this picture—al-
though the company of the German historians has become quite mixed in
the meantime. Since the 1980s, and especially under the influence of the
history of mentalities and of the Alltagsgeschichte, a growing number of Ger-
man historians have included ever-more categories of Nazi victims in the
picture, such as the physically and mentally “unfit,” Sinti and Roma, Soviet
prisoners of war, homosexuals, forced labor and “Asoziale.” And the
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, under the guidance of Manfred Messer-
schmidt, produced valuable volumes on the intimate relationships between
the Wehrmacht and the Nazi regime.
Significantly, however, the Wehrmacht-debate still shares several char-
acteristics with the Historikerstreit and with the Goldhagen-debate: they were
all initiated outside the German historical profession and were confronted
with massive opposition from within this profession. The Wehrmacht-debate,
as is known, refers to a photographic exhibition organized by the Hamburg
Institut für Sozialforschung, documenting the involvement of Wehrmacht
units in the murder of civilians in Eastern Europe, among them Jews. The
name of the exhibition is Vernichtungskrieg. Die Verbrechen der Wehrmacht in
Osteuropa 1941–1944. Actually, this debate can be interpreted as a direct se-
quel to the Goldhagen-debate, because the exhibition provides a clear-cut
answer to Goldhagen’s question “Who has done IT—except for the SD
and the SS?”
The Wehrmacht exhibition’s answer to this question is as simple as it is
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lucid: “Foremost German military, who were at the scene of the crime at
the time of the crime; in other words, foremost members of the German
Wehrmacht.” Given the fact that some twenty million Germans did their
service in the Wehrmacht during the war, and given the fact that the “split-
ting off” of the “clean” Wehrmacht from the “dirty” SS has been the post-
war myth of the generation of the perpetrators, this exhibition hit a very
sensitive nerve in the self-image of postwar Germany. The same goes for
the explicit inclusion of the military who staged the failed attempt on Hitler
in 1944 in the “dirty” Wehrmacht—traditionally presented as representing
the “other Germany”—because of their early knowledge of the mass kill-
ings of Jews and other civilians behind the eastern front.67
Recently, those resisting and criticizing the exhibition have cried victory
because some ten photos out of a total of some 800 have probably been
wrongly interpreted. Two articles by Bogdan Musial and Krisztian Ungvary,
criticizing the exhibition, have sparked a new phase in the discussion, lead-
ing to the temporary closure of the exhibition by the organizing Institut für
Sozialforschung in order to reassess all the exhibited material.68 Some
photos do not show the Wehrmacht military, but its Finnish and Hungarian
allies, and, more importantly, some photos show civilians killed by the So-
viet secret police during its retreat from the rapidly advancing German
army.
How many photos will turn out to be dubious still has to be assessed,
but most typical at the moment are the reactions of several German histori-
ans to the few proven factual errors. They were used by prominent histori-
ans such as Michael Stürmer, Horst Möller, director of the Institut für
Zeitgeschichte in Munich, Rolf-Dieter Müller of the Militärgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt, and Lothar Gall, former chair of the Verein der Historiker
Deutschlands, to bolster the conclusion that the exhibition is essentially an
amateurish fake and to plea for its final closure.69
In my view, these reactions by leading German specialists in contempo-
rary and military history again betray the traditional mechanism of transfer in
action. Instead of discussing the actual role of the Wehrmacht in the Holo-
caust on the basis of solid available evidence, this debate is avoided and
transferred to some ten mistaken photos documenting the minor involve-
ment of Finnish and Hungarian military and killings by the Soviet secret
police. And, significantly, nobody poses the question of how Finnish and
Hungarian troops ended up in the heart of Russia—although the answer is
quite obvious. Implicitly or explicitly, the message seems to be, again, that,
although a few Wehrmacht-military may have been involved in dirty busi-
ness, the exact role of the Wehrmacht vis-à-vis the civilian population in
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occupied Eastern Europe is not in need of any research.
Exactly for this reason, Reinhart Koselleck’s recent article, “Die Dis-
kontinuität der Erinnerung,” has added fuel to this fire. This famous historian
from Bielefeld presented a veteran perspective on World War II, while re-
producing the clichés about the ignorance of the saubere Wehrmacht to what
was happening behind its back. The Todesfurcht of the German soldiers for
the Red Army, the complete absence of any knowledge of German soldiers
with regard to the death camps and the Holocaust, the large number of
German civilian victims because of Allied bombing, expulsion and mass
rape, the impossibility to understand the Holocaust, and even the formal ju-
ridical exoneration of SS-killers all loom large in Koselleck’s wartime story.
And all this without much empathy regarding the victims of the Germans
and the other side of the front line. Symptomatically, Koselleck’s wartime
story does not start in June 1941, but in May 1945.70
In summary, like the Goldhagen-debate, the Wehrmacht-debate has
documented the continuing “forgetfulness” of a part of the German histo-
rians.71 The fact is that research on the actual perpetrators of the Holocaust
outside the SS and SD is still avoided by many of the “official” specialists in
the field of military history of World War II. The eight volumes of Das
Deutsche Reich und der Zweiten Weltkrieg, published by the Militärgeschichtli-
ches Forschungsamt, does not contain a single chapter on the involvement
of the Wehrmacht in the murder of the Jews, as Bartov observed. The same
holds true for more than three million Soviet prisoners of war who were
killed in one way or another by the Wehrmacht.72
If appearances do not deceive, however, times have been changing
since 1990. A younger generation of German historians, represented by
historians such as Christian Gerlach, Ulrich Herbert, Dieter Pohl, and
Thomas Sandkühler, has begun to “fill in” this blank spot on the map with
detailed studies of the German occupation policies in Eastern Europe and
to integrate the policies of extermination, including the Holocaust, into this
picture. Like Götz Aly, who also develops this new, “integrated” approach,
they emphasize the interwovenness of warfare, the ruthless economic ex-
ploitation of occupied territories in order to feed and supply the German
army, and the extermination policy toward “useless eaters” combined with
a political fantasy with regard to a “racially cleansed” and German-dominated
“East.” These “useless eaters” did not only consist of the Jews, but also of
60 percent of the Soviet prisoners of war, large numbers of the Russian ci-
vilian population—in White Russia some 20 percent of the total population
was killed in one way or another—the handicapped, and several other
groups of people. These studies have revealed the close collaboration of all
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German institutions involved—military and civilian, also with regard to the
Holocaust—and show an unsettling amount of initiatives at all policy-making
levels.73
Other younger historians, such as Klaus Latzel and Ulrike Jureit, in-
spired by the history of mentalities and the Alltagsgeschichte, have been
working on the reconstruction of the experience and the worldview of the
Wehrmacht generation, using their letters as the primary source. In this way
they are trying to trace, among other things, the influence of Nazi ideology
on ordinary Germans and to free the reconstructions of the war from the
ex post perspectives of veterans (including faked letters) and their ritualized
memoirs, which have dominated the military history of World War II for
decades. In this way they are trying to get beyond the traditional
self-stylizations of Germans as the “first victims” of Nazism, going back to
the war period itself. The recent interest in the history of the deserters sig-
nalizes the same interest in trying to get away from the traditional clichés
and to chart the “gray zone” between perpetrators and victims.74 Thus, all
in all, there has been a considerable widening of perspectives in the recent
German historiography of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, Omer Bartov’s
plea for a complete integration of the perspectives of the perpetrators and
victims still seems to be a while off.75
Conclusion
Is there any conclusion to be drawn from this sobering analysis? Well, my
conclusion is entailed by my analysis, so the best I can do is to summarize
my three theses. According to thesis number one, the Holocaust has been
present by its absence in the debates on German history, i.e., by its repression.
The centrality of the Third Reich in these debates has not implied the cen-
trality of the Holocaust. The problem of the “central focus” of Holocaust
historiography and of the integration of the “voices” of the perpetrators
and victims is thus still to be solved. Even at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the Holocaust in German history still appears to be
faced with the entanglement of “not being able to fully remember” and
“not being able to fully forget.” The most recent debates in case, the
Wehrmacht discussion and the debate on the role of German historians in
National Socialism, testify to that.
According to thesis number two, the repression of the Holocaust has
been subject to a substantial process of change, linked to the succession of generations.
This change has gradually eroded the taboo and silence and, in the meantime,
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brought about a considerable openness toward the Third Reich and an im-
pressive amount of research. Splitting off and projection are disappearing as
mechanisms of repression in serious academic historiography, leading to new
research in which the question “Who actually did IT?” is no longer evaded
and is directly confronted. Naturalistic metaphors of “catastrophes,” “Hit-
lerist” schemes, and “anonymous structures” no longer carry the burden of
explanation in the historiography of the second postwar generation of Ger-
man historians. Nevertheless, even now, many German grandsons of the ac-
tual generation of the perpetrators still have major problems in facing the
Holocaust, as is testified by the most recent public debates.
According to thesis number three, the linkage between the Holocaust and the
“German ‘catastrophe,’” present especially in rightist historiography, may ex-
plain the remarkable fact that the Holocaust has become more present in
unified Germany than ever before. Since the disappearance of the German
“counterweight” for the Holocaust—that is, their own “catastrophe”—the
Holocaust has been “unleashed” in German public debate, so to speak.
What we are witnessing in debates like the one on the role of historians
in National Socialism is, perhaps, the last phase of “working through” the
Nazi past. What distinguishes this phase from the previous ones is not only
the acknowledgement that the perpetrators of the Holocaust belong to the
generation of one’s own grandfathers and fathers and condemning them
for that, but, at the same time, the desire to understand them.76 After the
initial, complete repression of the Holocaust after 1945, and then the partial
repression during the 1970s, in the form of the total moral condemnation
of the whole perpetrator generation, often combined with a ritual form of
identification with the Nazi victims and of the Betroffenheits-culture, this
more or less open attitude is surely something new. Probably we should re-
gard the fact that some younger German historians have recently put the
“forgetfulness” of both their intellectual fathers and grandfathers on the
agenda from that perspective.
Of course, less optimistic diagnoses of the present state of the Berlin
Republic can also be argued—as has been done, for instance, by Omer
Bartov and Moshe Zuckermann—because there are also phenomena that
point in the direction of continuing repression, albeit in more subtle forms.
The remarkable renaissance of “totalitarianism” as the interpretative
scheme for “both German dictatorships” and the equally remarkable zeal to
equate the Nazi past and the GDR past, both in need of a similar Vergan-
genheitsbewältigung, is a case in point. The same goes for the remarkable re-
ception of Victor Klemperer’s diaries, of Spielberg’s Schindler’s List, or of
Schlink’s Der Vorleser, not to mention the continuing and excessive preoc-
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cupation with the Normalität of Germany and the constant reference to
Nazi Germany during international conflicts in the 1990s (during the Gulf
War, for instance, and recently in Kosovo = Auschwitz).77
However, “normalcy” is, of course, always a relative notion and any
judgment on the German historians and their way of handling the Holo-
caust can therefore only be based on systematic comparisons with the histo-
riographical ways in which other nations have handled their involvement in
the Holocaust or in comparable ordeals. This project has hardly begun.78
On the whole, Germany’s historiographical record on this score probably
compares quite favorably.79
In any case, I have a very strong feeling that the “Frankfurt Agenda”
will stay with the German historical profession. As Jürgen Kocka suggested,
“it is probably easier to kill your grandfather than to kill your father.” If
that is true, and to all appearances it is, time—helped by a new generation
of German historians—will tell.
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